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NOTES
Accountants' Liability to Third Parties For An Audit: In ascer-
taining the current financial status of a corporation the primary source
of reliable information is the independent audit. The audit is prepared
by a certified public accountant who is hired by a corporation for the
sole purpose of conducting the audit. This gives a potential investor
an objective view, one which is not tainted by corporate self-interest.
This is the reason that an investor looks first (and often last) to the
independent audit. However, the reliance which an investor places
in the work of the independent accountant is not fully recognized by
the courts. For example, if an accountant is negligent in the preparation
of an audit and an investor is damaged by his investment in the corpora-
tion in reliance upon the audit, the investor has no cause of action against
the accountant for his negligence. The corporation hired the accountant,
not the investor. Thus, there is no consensual relationship between the
investor and the accountant, and no basis for liability except fraud.
Background Cases and Recent Developments
The rule that an accountant is not liable to investors in the absence
of fraud or privity, has protected accountants since they became recog-
nized as a "skilled professional class" in 1905.1 The case of Ultramares
Corporation v. Touche firmly established the rule that an accounting
firm would not be held liable to third party investors for negligence.
Justice Cardozo stated that an investor, not in privity, could recover
only if the accountant's negligence was so gross as to "sustain an infer-
ence of fraud." 3 In subsequent cases this basic test was held to extend
liability only if the accountant made a "reckless misstatement" or had
"no genuine belief" in the facts in an audit.4 In Duro Sportswear v.
Cogen,5 the Ultramares standard was rigidly adhered to. In Cogen the
plaintiff was one of two shareholders in a corporation, and the audit
set the price of stock for a sale to the other shareholder. The purpose
and the parties were known to the auditor. The court held that the audi-
tor had no duty to exercise reasonable care and in the absence of privity
between the shareholder and the auditor the shareholder would have to
prove fraudulent conduct. Thus, the third party investor had to convince
the jury that the accountant was a "cheat" and not a mere "blunderer,"
and that the accountant actually knew the audit was in error when he
submitted it.6
1 Smith v. London Assurance Corp., 109 App. Div. 882, 96 N.Y.S. 820 (1905).
2255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).3 Id. at 191, 174 N.E. at 449.
4 State Street Trust Co. v. Ernest, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938). See
Annot., 54 A.L.R. 2d 345 (1957).
5 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
6 Note, The Judicial Process-Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 26 ILL. L. REv. 49
(1931).
Recently, the limited liability of accountants to investors has come
under increasing fire and the Ultramares decision-is being questioned.7
This is illustrated by the -recent case of Rusch. Factors, Inc. v. Levin"
where the defendant-accountant knew the plaintiff was the sole creditor
and that he would be relying upon the audit. The Federal District Court
found the accountant liable even though-there was an absence of fraud
and a lack of privity with the plaintiff. This decision is contrary to the
holding of the New York Court in Duro" Sportswear v. Cogen.9 However,
Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin'0 did not hold that an accountant may be
sued by any investor for negligence. Rather, the rule of Ultramares Cor-
poration v. Touche" was distinguished and the court applied the rule
of Glanzer v. Shephard.
2
. . the case at bar is qualitatively distinguishable from Ultra-
mares. There, the plaintiff was a member of an undefined, unlim-
ited class of remote lenders and potential equity holders not
actually foreseen but only foreseeable. Here the plaintiff is a
single party whose reliance was actually foreseen by the defend-
ant. The case at bar is, in fact, far more akin to the case of
Glanzer v. Shephard. . . . The Court does not rule upon, but
leaves open for reconsideration in the light of trial development,
the question of whether an accountant's liability for negligent
misrepresentation ought to extend to the full limits of foresee-
ability.13
Thus, Rusch Factors Inc. v. Levin stopped short of holding accountants
liable to all reasonable foreseeable third party investors on the basis
of negligence. However, unlike Ultramares which based liability on a
consensual relationship, Rusch Factors Inc. v. Levin revitalized the "end
andaim" concept of Glanzer v. Shephard and applied it to accountants.
The accountant's liability was based on the contemplated use of the audit
of which the accountant was aware when he prepared the audit. This
concept could be easily expanded so that accountant's liability to third
parties can be based on the contemplated use of the audit. For example,
if an accountant negligently prepared an independent audit and knew
it was to be distributed to the general public for the sale of stock, the
7 Investor confidence, -economic growth and stability are probably the basic
causes of the increase in suits by investors. Some specific reasons are given
by Alfred F. Yaude in The Impact of Changing Economic Philosophies on
the Public Accountant, 1966 TE NATIONAL PuBLic ACCOUNTANT 4 (Dec.).
8 284 F. Supp. 85 (D. R.I. 1968). Another example is the recent case of Fischer
v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), which held that an accountant
has a duty to disclose to the investor known material errors discovered after
an audit has been released to the public.
0 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
10 284 F. Supp. 85 (D. R.I. 1968).
"1255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
12 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). The defendant was a bean weigher who
contracted with a bean seller to weight a shipment of beans and certify the
weight to the plaintiff-bean buyer. The plaintiff (buyer) was able to recover
from the defendant (weigher) even though there was no privity, since the
"end and aim" of the transaction was known to the defendant.
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accountant could be held liable to any stock purchaser relying upon the
audit. On the other hand, an accountant called in to conduct an audit
with the understanding that it was to be used to obtain financial backing
from a bank would not be liable to purchasers of stock relying upon the
same audit reprinted in a prospectus. This is essentially the position
taken by the Restatement of Torts § 552, Tentative Draft No. 12: "It
is sufficient, in other words, that the maker knows that the information
is intended for repetition to a certain group or class of persons, and
that the plaintiff proves to be one of them, even though the maker never
had heard of him when the information was given."' 14 Tentative Draft
No. 12 makes it clear that the liability of an accountant is limited to the
particular transactions which he intends, or knows the contracting party
intends, that the audit be utilized.
Thus, accountants who negligently make an audit of the books of
the A Corporation, which they are told is to be used only for the
purpose of obtaining a particular line of banking credit, are not
subject to liability to a wholesale merchant whom the corporation
induces to supply it with goods on credit by showing him the audit
and the certification. On the other hand, it is not necessary that
the transaction in which the negligent audit is relied on shall be
identical in all of its minutest details with the one intended....
The question may be one of extent of departure which the maker
of the representation understands is to be expected. [T]he ques-
tion becomes one of whether the departure from the contemplated
transaction is so major, and so significant, that it cannot be re-
garded as essentially the same transaction. 15
The Restatement rule should be adopted so that the scope of the
accountant's liability for a negligent audit is intended to include any
contemplated use of the audit and not limited to mere consensual rela-
tionship. This rule would be sound because: (1) privity has become an
outmoded concept in tort law, and (2) the professional standards of
accountants bespeak a broader responsibility to contemplated investors
for a negligent audit.16
Privity-A Dated Concept in Tort Law
Courts have relied upon the doctrine of privity as a convenient means
of limiting the liability of accountants. However, this same doctrine has
1"284 F. Supp. 85 (D. R.I. 1968) at 91, 93.
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, comment It at 23 (Tent. Draft No.
12, 1966).
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, comment i at 26, 27 (Tent. Draft No.
12, 1966).
16 It should be noted that the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 are
patterned after Ultramares Corporation v. Touche in some respects and es-
tablished statutory liability for accountants on the federal level for audits
submitted pursuant to these acts. For purposes of this discussion, however, it
is important only to note that these Acts did not preempt the field and courts
are still free to expand the liability of accountants: "The rights and remedies
provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and
remedies that may exist at law or in equity . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 78 bb(a), (1964).
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been consistently swept aside in other areas of tort law in order to obtain
a duty standard more in keeping with justice and the economic-social
needs of society. Winterbottorn v. Wright'7 established the general rule
that a person could not recover from a manufacturer or a seller of a
product on the basis of negligence unless there existed a contract be-
tween the two parties. It was inevitable that this rule of law, formulated
before the industrial revolution, should become subject to exceptions and
limitations as the twentieth century was ushered in. The first major
exception to the rule of privity was the "inherently dangerous when
defective" product.' 8 As the exceptions have grown, a number of states,
including Wisconsin, have completely rejected the doctrine of privity
in a tort action based on negligence. 9 In Smith v. Atco Co. 20 the Wis-
consin Supreme Court stated:
We deem that the time has come for this court to flatly declare
that in a tort action for negligence against a manufacturer, or
supplier, whether or not privity exists is. wholly immaterial. The
question of liability should be approached from the standpoint
of the standard of care to be exercised by the reasonably prudent
person in the shoes of the defendant manufacturer or supplier.
Such an approach will eliminate any necessity of determing
whether a particular product is "inherently dangerous." 2'
The same view was expressed in Todd Shipyards Corporation v. United
States:" "The real answer to the argument, however, is that the as-
serted rule relied on (privity), though formerly widely followed, has
shrivelled up and died in the light of modem reason and authority."2'
The same forces of change and progress which forced a retreat
from Winterbottom v. Wright4 are also forcing a reexamination of the
privity requirement established in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche.25
The revolution in economics and its impact on accountants was high-
lighted by Mr. J. W. Queenan 6 in an address to the Third Congress of
Chartered Accountants of South Africa on April 25, 1966:
The economic system, after having progressed at a relatively
slow pace for centuries has been revolutionized by the advance-
ment in technology and by changes in the industrial organizations
and government activities. Many enterprises have come to rely
on external capital and credit which has separated ownership
I7152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
is MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
19 To date, 19 states have completely rejected the doctrine of privity in negligence
actions. See Annot., 54 A.L.R. 2d 345 (1957) and A.L.R. 2d LATER CASE SERV-
ICE.
2 "6 Wis. 2d 371, 94 N.W.2d 697 (1959).
21 Id. at 383, 94 N.W.2d at 704.
2"69 F. Supp. 609 (S.D. Me. 1947).
23 Id. at 610.
24 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
2 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
2GManaging partner, Haskins and Sells.
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from management. These developments have had a vital impact
on the economy of the free world and on the progress of our
profession. Accounting has become increasingly important for
internal administration and control and for external financial re-
porting. In countries with a highly developed industry . . . the
accounting profession has progressed from a small group of
practitioners concentrated in a few centers of -population and
unrecognized publicly, to a well organized profession enjoying
world wide influence.
2 7
In commenting upon Ultramares Corporation v. Touche,28 the Court
in Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga stated:
Without passing upon matters not before this Court, it may be
observed in this connection that there have been significant
changes in the American society during the 30 years that have
elapsed since the decision in the Ultramares case. The continued
growth and expansion of industry, the growth of population, the
urbanization of society, the growing complexity of business re-
lations and the growing specialization of business functions all
require more and more reliance in business transactions upon the
representations of specialists. 29
There appears to be little substantive difference between a manufac-
turer who puts his goods on the market and the accountant who pre-
pares an audit. Just as a retailer turns to the manufacturer for goods
which he can distribute to the consumer, so the corporation goes to the
accountant for an independent audit that can be distributed to obtain
financing. The fact that an auditor doesn't know the specific parties who
will be relying upon his audit is as immaterial to a standard.of duty as
is the case with a manufacturer. The result of a negligently prepared
audit upon investors is just as "foreseeable" as damage to the consumer
who buys a negligently manufactured product.
However, the accountant, like the manufacturer, should not be held
liable for any use made of an audit which was not contemplated in its
preparation. In addition, any investor bringing suit against the ac-
countant must prove that he did in fact rely upon the audit. Thus, an
investment based on a "tip" or any information other than a personal
analysis of the audit would render a negligently prepared audit immate-
rial. In this respect, the scope of an accountant's potential liability is
27 Queenan, Accountant of Tomorrow, 33 VITAL SPEECHEs, 200 (Jan. 15, 1967).
2825 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
29204 F. Supp. 821 at 833 (E. D. Tenn. 1962), rev'd, 329 F. 2d 402 (6th Cir.
1964). This case dealt with the negligence of an engineering firm in omission
of geological data from a boring log report which misled the plaintiff sub-
contractor who was not in privity with the defendant engineer. While the
District Court held the defendant firm liable for negligence, the decision was
reversed on appeal because there was a disclaimer and warning involved to
the contractor and the defendant did not know the plaintiff at the time the
report was made. For an analysis of this case and its application to negligent
audits, see Bradley, Liability to Third Persons for Negligent Audit, 1966 THE
JOURNAL OF BusINEss LAW, 190.
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greatly reduced, "for a large number of investors (stockholders) cannot
effectively analyze a balance sheet. Even if an investor, can establish
that he has sufficient expertise to read a balance sheet, he must still
convince a jury that his investment was in fact based upon his reliance
on a negligent audit.
Professional Responsibility to the Investor
Courts have limited the liability of accountants to third parties, but
the accounting profession itself has recognized that their primary ob-
ligation is not to the contracting party but to the investor.30 Accountants
have also proclaimed that investors should "look upon the accountant
as an impartial investigator in whom full reliance may be placed for
the disclosure of all information relative to accountants which they are
rightfully entitled, whether such information be favorable or unfavorable
to the interests of the management." 3' However, it has been alleged that
some accounting firms are "willing to bend to the will of management
for fear that the company will go to the competition in this highly com-
petitive business. '3 2 This exemplifies the need for the same legal stand-
ard of care between accountant and investor as now exists between
accountant and 'corporation.3 3 If professional standards are to be in-
sured, the accountant should owe a duty of reasonable care to both
investor and corporation.
The needs of the investor (an objective appraisal of the corporation),
not that of the corporation, are the motivating factors which prompt an
independent audit. Thus, it becomes a highly questionable practice to
allow a profession to be employed and gain the benefits of a position
of trust, without insisting it assume the responsibilities which accompany
that position.
Liability of Accountants to Third Parties for Negligence:
An Undue Burden?
If accountants are held liable for negligence to all reasonably fore-
seeable parties within the scope of intended use of the audit, what will'
be the effect on the profession? The spectre of undue burden compelled
30 See May, The Accountant and the Investor, VAWTER LECTUms (1932), reprinted
in part in 1942 Wis. L. REv. 391.
31 Andersen, The Accountant and the Investor, VAWTER LEcruREs (1932), re-
printed in part in 1932 Wis. L. REv. 391.
32 New York Times, Nov. 20, 1966, § 3, at 1, col. 1. An example of the pressure
which is brought to bear on some accountants was described by an accountant
hired by a construction company which "cailmed a lot of work in progress
that I never saw. In my certification of his annual report, I qualified it by
saying that I never saw them. When the executive came back from the bank
after having been denied a $100,000 loan because of my qualification, he was
furious and wanted me to drop it. I refused and he fired me sayiig 'I'll get
a C.P.A. who'll play ball with me!'" Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1966, at
1, col. 1.
33The court in Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D. R.I. 1968) at
91 made passing reference to this factor: "Finally, wouldn't a rule of fore-
seeability elevate the cautionary techniques of the accounting profession?"
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the court in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche 4 to limit accountant's
liability for negligence:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder,
the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of de-
ceptive entries, may expose accountants to liability in an inde-
terminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are
so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in
the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences."'
However, the point overlooked in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche
is that liability is based on the standard of the professional accountant.3 6
Thus an accountant will not be an insurer of the financial success of in-
vestors, nor will liability fall for every "thoughtless slip or blunder." 37
The burden of professionalism was underscored by Mr. Walter E.
Hanson s in a paper delivered to the New York Bar Association, Febru-
ary 3, 1966: "He (the accountant) is expected to, and must have, the
skills and competence of his profession, and he willingly accepts the
responsibility." 39
Liability for professional negligence to third parties will not auto-
matically result in injustice and financial ruin being levied upon ac-
countants. Rather, the result will be to insure the use of professional
standards. If a corporation limits the investigation of an independent
accountant, or if goods or work in progress cannot actually be seen,
the accountant can note this in his report. In this manner an accountant
can limit the basis upon which an investor can bring suit against him.
But more important, such a step would also be in keeping with sound
accounting principles and consistent with a sense of professionalism.
It is inevitable that an accountant will at some time be negligent.
For this contingency liability insurance is available to accountants.40
34255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
5 Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
36 The general standards are: "1. The examination is to be performed by a per-
son or persons having adequate technical training and proficiency as an auditor:
2. In all matters relating to the assignment an independence in mental attitude
is to be maintained by the auditor and the auditors: 3. Due professional care
is to be exercised in the performance of the examination and the preparation
of the report. AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, issued by the Committee
on Auditing Procedures of the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants, 666 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y.
7 Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 225 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).38 Member, Council of American Institute of Public Accountants.
39 Hanson, Responsibilities of Independent Public Accountants, 22 THE BusINESS
LAWYER, 975 (1967).
40 There appears to be some conflict as to the availability of insurance for ac-
countants. It was reported that in 1965 15 firms were underwriting accountants
liability, and by the end of 1966 that number had dropped to six, and the
premium costs increased by 30% in 1966. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1966,
at 1, col. 1. However, a more recent publication indicates that a total of nine
insurance companies are underwriting accountants liability. One of these com-
panies supplies coverage as a special accommodation, and seven write for a
particular class of accountants on a ilmited basis. POLICY FORM AND MANUAL
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Basing accountant's liability on the contemplated use of an audit rather
than a consensual relationship will increase the cost of liability insu-
rance. However, this added expense will be passed on to the business
community in the form of higher fees. The corporation will in turn
either pass on the cost to consumers, or the stockholder will receive a
smaller dividend. The end result will be greater protection to the public
served by the accounting profession.
Conclusion
Rusch Factors v. Levin established a reasonable basis for account-
ant's liability; the contemplated use of the audit known by the accountant.
This case recognized the independent audit as the primary source of
reliable information to the investor. The decision is justified in light of
the professional standard of the accountant and the fact that a duty
standard based on a consensual relationship is no longer applicable to
negligence cases. It is submitted that these factors justify an abrogation
of the privity requirement established in Ultramares Corporation v.
Touche, and an expansion of the accountant's liability to third parties
for negligence premised on the contemplated use of the audit known to
the accountant when preparing his report.
ARNOLD P. ANDERSON
Federal Taxation-Income in Respect of a Decedent-Discount
Notes: In the case of Levin v. United States,' the First Circuit Court
of Appeals considered several questions in the area of federal estate
and income taxation. In the Levin case, an action was brought by
an executrix to recover an alleged overpayment of income tax by
the estate. Since the actual facts involved in the controversy were
quite complicated, the court adopted a simplified example in order
to better illustrate the legal principles involved.
In the hypothetical transaction adopted by the court, the dece-
dent had lent $8,000 in return for a four-year note having a face
value of $10,000 and an interest rate of 6%. The $2,000 difference
between the amount advanced and the face value of the note was
designated "discount income." In reporting his taxable income, the
decedent had employed the cash method of accounting. Thus, as he
received payments on the face (i.e., excluding the 6% interest) he
allocated 80% to principal and 20% to "discount income." For his
own records he had used the accrual method of accounting and had
recorded the discount in equal installments each year, regardless
of whether the entire amount was paid. At the time of the decedent's
death (two years after the note had been executed), he had been
ANALYSIS SERvIcE, Accountant's Professional Liability Policy (§ 273.1), pub-
lished by Rough Notes Co. Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana (July 1968).
'Levin v. United States, 373 F.2d 434 (1st Cir. 1967).
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